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Abstract: The Changing Character of the European Banking Market 
 
 
At present West European banks are increasingly branching out into asset management 
as well as the consulting business, which cannot be directly influenced by monetary 
controls. We have therefore carried out a regression analysis and a factor analysis of 
banks’ balance-sheet items, and we have also plotted figures from banks’ income 
statements. Our analyses fulfil a triple purpose. First, they shed much light on the 
positioning strategies deployed by European banks. Second, they reveal different 
tendencies in respect of the refinancing strategies that are adopted when credits are 
granted to non-banks. Third, they make it possible to assess the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. There is clear evidence that the European Central Bank’s money 
supply policy will prove less and less efficient as banks increasingly resort to 
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Introduction 
The way monetary targeting is managed depends on how money is defined, and money may 
be defined in many different ways. All the current definitions, however, have one thing in 
common, viz. they invariably comprise liability items in banks’ balance sheets. Consequently, 
these balance sheets remain unchanged (a) when banks provide assistance to customers who 
wish to raise funds in the capital markets;  and (b) if banks – at least partially – refinance 
loans via assets (securities), they exert no influence whatever on the quantity of money. 
However, even if banks refinance their loans by liability items, reference to the quantity of 
money M3 can be problematic because the means of payment (M1) and the amount of 
liquidity within the banking sector (M3-M1) develop in opposite directions, a process which 
will be neutralized – at least partially – within the aggregate M3. This is why broad money is 
endogeneously determined; “the starting point of this endogeneity thesis is the assertion that it 
is loans that cause deposits (and not the other way around).”
1  
Until the early 1980s, the continental European system was largely bank-based, while the 
U.S. and U. K. systems had become market-based. In 1994, only 16% of the capital borrowed 
by firms in the U.S. came from banks, while 49% was raised by issuing securities. By 
contrast, 80% of corporate borrowing in Germany was from banks and only 10% from 
securities markets.
2 Over the last twenty years, the European financial system has become 
more market-based – a change due to two factors: (a) improvements in the processing and 
transmission of information and (b) the process of European integration.
3 This trend will be 
                                                      
* This contribution was written in August and September 2003, during a research visit to the International    
Monetary Fund in Washington, D.C. (USA). 
1 Cf. Caporale/Howells 2001: 548. 
2 Cf. Rajan/Zingales 2003: 5. 
3 Cf. Rajan/Zingales 2003: 57. 
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reinforced as a result of the transition to a single European currency, which was launched as 
early as 1999, although the new coins and banknotes were not issued until 2002. 
Section 1 describes in outline the prospects of the West European banks. Owing to the 
introduction of the euro, every bank within the EMU zone can now expand its market area 
beyond its national borders.  European banks are now increasingly expanding into asset 
management as well as the consulting business – activities which enable them to raise funds 
for customers in ways which cannot be influenced by monetary controls. 
Section 2 examines the positioning of Europe’s big banks with the aid of a regression 
analysis, a factor analysis of balance-sheet items and a graphical representation of income 
statements. Our analyses reveal different tendencies in respect of the refinancing strategies 
that are adopted when credits are granted to non-banks (refinancing by assets and refinancing 
by liabilities). The adjustments of equity capital play a considerable role, too. 
Section 3 attempts to assess the effectiveness of monetary policy by drawing inferences from 
the development of the European banking market. The European Central Bank’s money 
supply policy will prove increasingly inefficient if banks continue refinancing by assets and 
expanding their banking services by branching out into the consulting business.   
1. The Incentives offered by the New Currency 
As we have already pointed out, the way monetary targeting is managed depends on how 
money is defined, and all the current definitions comprise liability items in banks’ balance 
sheets. It follows therefore that monetary policy essentially aims at influencing the 
composition of liability items in banks’  balance sheets. 
 assets  liabilities 
cash  bank deposits  d  b
central bank deposits  }   B  non-bank deposits (dnb):
loans to banks  l  b demand deposits  d  d
loans to customers  lc other deposits  d  o
securities  sa debt securities in issue  s  l
other assets  o  a capital  c 
other liabilities  o  l  3
Assuming for simplicity of exposition that oa = ol  , the bank’s balance sheet may be 
represented by the following equation: 
(1)   B + lb + lc + sa = db + (dd + do) + sl + c. 
Since monetary targeting usually seeks to influence (dd + do + sl), banks have little effect on 
the money supply when they refinance loans via assets or provide assistance to customers 
who wish to raise funds in the capital markets. 
In the past, the success of the monetary policy pursued by the Deutsche Bundesbank was 
primarily due to the fact that German investors financed their investments mainly by bank 
loans which in turn were refinanced by deposits (do) and debt securities in issue (sl). As can 
be seen from Figure 1, the same is probably true for most of the countries which have signed 


















When there was a rise in the rate of change of M1
4, there was almost invariably a decrease in 
the rate of change of refinancing sources
5, and these sources were equal to the difference 
                                                      
4 M1 comprises the monetary base held by non-banks and demand deposits dd. 
5 The refinancing sources comprise deposits do and debt securities in issue sl with an original duration of two 
years. 
 
Figure 1: Annual change in the quantity of money within the EMU
between January 1981 and July 2003of 1998
calculated by the  European Central Bank  until the end of 1998 















































































Figure 1: Annual change in the quantity of money within the EMU
between January 1981 and July 2003of 1998
calculated by the  European Central Bank  until the end of 1998 














































































money M1 (M3-M1)  4
between M3 and M1
6. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that new bank loans can 
only be financed by demand deposits if customers can be persuaded to convert some of their 
idle demand deposits into deposits represented by (M3-M1). 
There are still considerable differences in the ways in which European banks refinance loans, 
but the arrival of the euro has brought about dramatic changes in this domain by enabling all 
the banks within the European Monetary Union (EMU) to create uniform means of payment.
7 
It is now possible for money created in one member state to be used as a means of payment in 
another member country. The radius of banking activity has been enlarged, but at the same 
time domestic banks have lost the protection afforded by Europe’s national currencies
8. In 
order to withstand the full blast of Europe-wide competition, they will have no choice but to 
adapt to the new situation. 
Since competition is going to squeeze margins in the traditional banking sector, banks may 
look for new sources of profit beyond the ambit of conventional commercial banking
9. In 
other words, they may be tempted to expand their activities in areas such as investment 
banking and consulting banking. “Credit institutions within Europe are mainly expanding into 
asset management and the business of investment services in general”.
10 
Under the terms of the Basle Accord I (1988), big credits have to be notified if they exceed 
10% of the bank’s equity capital. The way this regulation is applied depends on the risk 
category into which a credit falls
11. A credit granted to a single bank client may not exceed 
25% of the bank’s equity capital
12. The Basle Accord II, which is to become effective by 
2005, tightens the minimum capital requirements by including credit risk as well as explicit 
capital requirements for operational risk
13. 
                                                      
6 The only exception was 1990, the year when German reunification brought about an extension of Germany’s 
currency area. 
7 Cf. Borchert 1999: 59. 
8 Cf. Bagliano/Dalmazzo/Marini 1999: 979. 
9 Cf. Milbourn/Boot/Thakor 1999: 196. 
10 Cf. European Central Bank 2000: 14. 
11 Cf. Walsh 1994: 50. 
12 Cf. Norton 1994: 214. 
13 Cf. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 2001: 1.   5
Summary: Traditionally, European banks have refinanced credits by liability items in their 
balance sheets. Owing to the introduction of the euro, every bank within the EMU zone can 
now expand its market area beyond its national borders. This results in increased competition 
which is inducing banks to resort to M&A with a view to achieving cost reductions, synergy 
effects and increases  in  equity  capital.  But,  what  is  more,  European  banks  are now 
increasingly expanding into asset management as well as the consulting business – activities 
which enable them to raise funds for customers in ways which cannot be influenced by 
monetary controls. 
2. The Positioning of the Big Banks in Western Europe 
What is causing a stir in the general public is above all the way the Western European 
banking sector is being restructured by mergers and acquisitions (M&A), with big banks 
shifting their business segment from book credit allocation to credit brokerage via the market. 
At the same time, the banks’ share of pure interest income is declining in favour of the share 
of revenue from consulting banking, investment banking and wholesale banking (credit 
brokerage). 
2.1. Regression Analysis of Balance Sheet Items 
This empirical analysis focuses on the big European banks. All the results reported here are 
based on data provided by the balance sheets of big banks. We have chosen to ignore the 
activities of small banks, which are assumed to consist mainly in cost cutting and shifting 
their customers’ deposits. 
In what now follows, the 50 largest banks in Europe are referred to by the numbers appended 
to their names in Appendix II
14. A cross-section analysis was carried out, and data from the 
banks in question  were  normalised  by  the banks’  total assets  for the year 2002. No 
distinction was made between countries which have already signed up for the single currency, 
those which will probably join EMU in the not too distant future (Great Britain, Denmark and 
Sweden), and those which have decided to remain outside (Switzerland). 
                                                      
14 WGZ-Bank (# 52) – listed in Appendix II – is not one of the largest European banks.   6
We shall begin by using regression analysis to test the main factors required for refinancing 
loans to customers lc. If we take the balance sheet on page 2 as our point of departure and if, 
for simplicity’s sake, we assume that oa = ol and that lb = db
15, equation (2) follows logically 
from equation (1): 
 (2)   lc = f(B, sa, dnd, sl, c).  
The 2002 balance sheets of the 50 biggest banks were compared with the corresponding 
documents for the year 2001. Owing to their M&A activities, however, the names of the 
banking companies change. As a result, some of the big banks are excluded from the 
calculations for 2001. 
The results of the regression analysis for the year 2002 are shown in equation (3) and Table 1: 
(3)  lc = 2,2 + 0,18·B – 0,14·sa + 0,42·dnb + 0,39·sl – 0,19·c. 
          (2,12)  (0,12)    (-0,84)    (2,33)       (2,80)    (-0,99) 
The t-statistics (in brackets) indicate that not all of the variables are statistically significant. 
The minus sign prefixed to the variable “securities sa” means that selling securities from the 
portfolio leads to an increase in the number of loans granted by banks (asset substitution). 
Table 1:    A  résumé of the model
b) 
R R-square  adjusted  R-square standard  deviation 
 0,451
a) 0,204  0,113  2,253 
a independent variables:(constant), B/a = monetary base at banks/assets, sl/a = securities in issue/assets,       
               sa/a = securities/assets, dnb/a = customers´ deposits/assets, c/a = equity capital/assets.                          
b dependent variable: lc/a = loans to customers/assets 
Number of observations: 48 
Although some of the variables were not statistically significant, we continued to use all of 
the variables in order to be able to draw comparisons between the data for 2001 and 2002. 
The results of the regression analysis for the year 2001 are shown in equation (4) and Table 2: 
(4)  lc = 1,2 – 0,09·B – 0,69·sa + 0,27·dnb + 0,52·sl + 0,06·c.  
          (2,67)  (-0,67)   (-4,93)     (1,69)      (3,57)     (0,38) 
                                                      
15 Loans to banks (lb) and bank deposits (db) are used mainly for settlements between banks.   7
Table 2:    A  résumé of the model
b) 
R R-square  adjusted  R-square standard  deviation 
 0,756
a) 0,571  0,485  6,66 
a independent variables:(constant), B/a = monetary base at banks/assets, sl/a = securities in issue/assets,       
               sa/a = securities/assets, dnb/a = customers´ deposits/assets, c/a = equity capital/assets.                         
b dependent variable: lc/a = loans to customers/assets 
Number of observations: 38 
 
If we compare equations (3) and (4), we can see that in 2001 and 2002 the variables B and c 
had an entirely different significance for the banks under discussion. In 2002 the build-up of 
equity capital c was detrimental to lending. In 2001, however, loans were still made according 
to the amount of equity capital at the banks’ disposal. 
The year 2002 saw an increase in lending that was linked to a rise in the amount of central 
bank money B held by the banks. In 2001, however, the situation was quite different. Owing 
to the shortage of overall demand, financing loans was regarded as a low priority, and liquid 
assets were used instead to build up the central bank’s money stock B. 
Summary: In 2001 and 2002 the lending policies pursued by the big European banks were 
determined to a considerable extent by their customer deposits (dnb) and by securities 
(“securities” sa and “securities in issue” sl). Since 2001 banks have been adjusting their equity 
capital c in the run-up to Basle Accord II. 
2.2. Factor Analysis of balance sheets 
A factor analysis was carried out in which normalised key data from large European banks 
were reduced to two factors. When we have a large number of interdependent variables (e.g. 
balance sheet items) of different objects (e.g. banks), a factor analysis can be used to extract 
certain underlying independent factors, thereby reducing the number of explanatory   
variables. The correlation between these factors and the original variables gives us the “factor 
loadings” presented in the Varimax-rotated factor matrix in Table 3a (2002) and Table 3b 
(2001) in Appendix I. The coordinate axes represent mean values of the factors obtained fot 
the sample that was selected. For details see Appendix I. Our analysis of balance-sheet items 
yields two different factors for the years 2001 (Figure 2) and 2002 (Figure 3).   8
For the year 2001 factor 1 was interpreted as liquidity (B, dnb, c) and factor 2 as securities     
(sa, sl). As can be seen from Figure 2, securities play a prominent role in cases where bank 
loans to non-banks have to be refinanced. It should, however, be borne in mind that the 
German banks (light shading) include a great many Landesbanken, which act as central banks 
for Germany’s Sparkassen  (savings banks), and which traditionally rely in large part on 
securities of issue as a source of refinancing. 









    
  Source: The author’s own calculations based on data provided by the 50 largest European banks 
For the year 2002 factor 1 was interpreted as liabilities (dnb, sl, c), and factor 2 was 







































































































































    Source: The author’s own calculations based on data provided by the 50 largest European banks 
 
As can be seen from Figure 3, a considerable number of banks already refinance with the aid 
of assets. As far as refinancing is concerned, most of Germany’s Landesbanken, however, 
rely less heavily than the average bank on assets, their main sources of refinancing being 
securities in issue and savings bank deposits. 
When we compare the figures for 2001 and 2002, we see that the two factors which are 
beginning to crystallise differ with respect to their composition – a finding already suggested 
by the regression analysis. In both of the years under discussion, it was not only balance-sheet 
item B that had a different significance for the banks; the same was true of item sl. In both 
years, however, factors 1 and 2 were the sources of refinancing that banks tapped whenever 
they granted loans to non-banks. There are considerable differences between the methods that 
Western European banks adopt when they have to  refinance loans. Their balance sheet 
structure, however, will no doubt be modified by disintermediation and developments in the 
capital markets
16. 
                                                      
16 Cf. Belaisch/Kodres/Levy/Ubide 2001: 38. 
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Summary: All the banks are now increasingly refinancing their credit supply by items not 
subject to monetary control. Whichever type of security banks opt for, the quantity of money 
remains almost unchanged. In the case of debt securities in issue, however, the quantity of 
money only remains unchanged if the original duration of the securities is longer than two 
years. 
2.3. A Graphical Representation of Income Statements 
In order to ascertain business trends, we analysed income statements submitted by the 50 
largest European banks. The focus of our analysis was on their net interest income (interest 
income minus interest expenses) and their net commission income (commission income 
minus commission expenses). The relevant numbers were plotted as shown in Figures 4a 
(2001) and 4b (2002). All the data were normalised by the volume of assets indicated in the 
balance sheets. 
                  Figure 4: Business trends according to income statements submitted for 2002 







          Source: The author’s own calculations based on data provided by the 50 largest European banks 
Our analysis shows that at present, as far as banking profits are concerned, greater importance 
still attaches to net interest income. The diagonals in Figures 4a and 4b represent a uniform 
distribution of the two types of bank earnings. The relative decline in net interest income in 
2002 is due to a fall in the number of loans extended to non-banks during this period. 
net interest income































































































































































































































































































Figure 4a: year 2001 Figure 4b: year 2002
net interest income































































































































































































































































































Figure 4a: year 2001 Figure 4b: year 2002  11
Nonetheless, there is clear evidence that banks are moving closer and closer to a state where 
interest and commission income will be uniformly distributed. 
These two types of income are the components of banks´ credit terms, i.e. (1) net interest 
income obtained during the refinancing process, and (2) revenues from consulting business as 
well as those gained by providing assistance to customers desirous of raising funds in the 
capital markets (i.e. profits derived from the securitisation process). Competition will force 
the banks to offer a wider range of off-balance sheet services in order to boost commission 
earnings. 
Summary: When West European banks want to refinance their credit supply, they increasingly 
resort to disintermediation. Consequently, even if the assets in the banks’ balance sheets were 
in line with minimum reserve requirements, the central bank’s ability to exercise monetary 
control would be severely limited.
17 As time progresses, attempts to control the quantity of 
money will become increasingly ineffectual. 
3. Consequences for monetary policy 
There is little doubt that small banks with a local market will survive, and central banks will 
continue to focus their efforts on small banks as an object of monetary targeting. Nonetheless, 
small banks will have no choice but to adapt to the activities in which big banks engage. 
In Europe these big banks are working towards three objectives: (1) cost-cutting
18, (2) 
diversifying the services on offer, and (3) increasing equity capital. On the one hand, the 
activities in question pose a threat to banks by inducing them to accept a higher level of 
risk
19; on the other hand they offer certain advantages since increased diversification makes 
bankruptcy less likely
20. 
When banks diversify, they seek to achieve two goals: (a) increased refinancing (of their 
credits) by assets and (b) shifting the burden of financing onto the capital market. A very 
                                                      
17 Cf. Borchert 2002: 57-59. 
18 This is especially true of small credit institutions. 
19 They imagine they are too big to fail. 
20 Cf. Mishkin 1999: 680 and 686.   12
broadly defined money supply (M3) – consisting of the credit institutions’ liabilities – then 
becomes less efficient as an instrument of monetary policy. 
The mainstays of ECB monetary policy used to be the monetary target
21 and the Eurosystem’s 
internal inflation forecast
22. In May 2003, however, the ECB adopted a new two-phase policy 
plan. The first phase is an economic analysis designed to identify short- to medium-term risks 
to price stability, while the second phase is a monetary analysis which takes account of 
variations in a wide range of monetary indicators, including M3, its components and 
counterparts, notably credit, and various measures of excess liquidity
23. 
It should, however, be emphasised that “monetary policy works not just through its direct 
effects on interest rates, but also through its effects on other asset prices.”
24 In a country like 
the U.S.A., movements in the Dow Jones index (DJ) can therefore be assessed with some 
degree of accuracy by the amount of liquidity inside (M3-M1) and outside the banking sector 
(FA-(M3-M1)), with  FA = financial assets: 
                     
 (5)  DJ = f((M3-M1), (FA-(M3-M1))           with          r








                                                      
21 The monetary target was considered as an indicator, not an intermediate target. 
22 Cf. Rudebusch/Svensson 1999: 17. 





























































Source : The author´s own calculations based on data from 
Datastream





















































































































































































































































Source : The author´s own calculations based on data from 
Datastream

































































































































Up to now there is no clear evidence to suggest that a similar connection exists between 
EuroSTOXX and liquid assets inside and outside the banking sector in Western Europe.  
If commercial banks continue to refinance loans via assets and to provide assistance to 
customers desirous of raising funds in the capital markets, the proper way for the ECB to 
influence investment financing securitisation via monetary policy will be to resort to some 
kind of interest rate policy, and pursuing such a policy will involve some sort of inflation 
targeting
25. Be that as it may, “the uncertainty associated with the introduction of the new 







Appendix I: The Principles of Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis is a statistical technique designed to reduce a set of observable variables to a 
small(er) number of latent factors. The underlying assumption is that there are a number of 
unobserved variables (so-called factors) that account for correlations among observed 
                                                                                                                                                                      
24 Cf. Mishkin 2001: 9. According to an empirical investigation conducted by the Deutsche Bundesbank (2002: 
49), the same seems to be true for Germany. 
25 Cabos et al. have carried out a regression analysis for Germany which shows that inflation targeting yielded    
   better results than monetary targeting for the period 1970-1997. Cf. Cabos/Funke/Siegfried (2001): 231. 
26 Svensson/Woodford 2003: 2.   14
variables. If this assumption is correct, each observed variable (y) can be expressed as a 
weighted composite of a set of latent  factors (f).  
This idea is formalised in the following system of equations: 
            y1  = a11 f11    +  a12 f12   + ...  +  a1n f1n   + e1 
 y 2  = a21 f21    +  a22 f22   + ...  +  a2n f2n   + e2 
 ... 
 y m = am1 fm1  +  am2 fm2  + ...  + amn fmn  + em. 
Assuming that the residuals (e) are uncorrelated with any of the observed variables, the 
correlations among the observed variables are accounted for by the factors (f). Since the main 
purpose of factor analysis is data reduction, a precondition is n < m.  
In order to obtain significant results it is advisable to carry out the factor analysis as follows: 
(1) Selecting a factor model: In the present case the most useful technique is principal 
component analysis. The purpose of this procedure is not to ascertain causes, but to reduce 
variables to a common denominator. The communality estimate
27 for a variable is therefore 
assumed to be 1. 
(2) Determining the number of factors: The decision is ultimately subjective. From the 
economic point of view, there is one important requirement. One must be able to interpret the 
factors. If one wishes to verify a theory which suggests a certain number of factors, a factor 
analysis should be carried out with the prespecified number of factors. These factors should 
have an eigenvalue greater than 1 (Kaiser-Guttman rule). 
(3) The rotation of factors: The idea of data reduction provides the most common basis for 
rotation. The aim is to rotate the factors simultaneously in order to have the greatest possible 
number of zero loadings on each factor. The rotation method used in the present study is the 
simplest one, namely an orthogonal rotation in which the angle between the reference axes of 
                                                      
27 By communality estimate we mean the approximate calculation of the proportion of the variable’s variance 
which is free of error and which is shared with other variables in the matrix.   15
factors is maintained at 90 degrees (Varimax rotation). The factor loadings of the rotated area 
appeared at the end of this process. 
(4) At the final stage of the operation the factor matrix shows how the variables are related to 
the factors. 
A factor analysis was carried out as a principal component analysis in which the key figures 
of the big west European banks were reduced to certain factors. The scree plots in Figure 6 











According to the Kaiser-Guttman-rule the factors should have an eigenvalue above 1. That 
applies to two factors in Figure 6a as well as in Figure 6b. The correlation between these 
factors and the original variables gives us the factor loadings represented in the Varimax 
rotated factor matrix in Tables 3a and 3b.                                          
Figure 6: Scree plots 
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factors  Table 3a: year 2001 
Rotated factor matrix
a) 
balance sheet items 
1 2 
equity capital c 0,539  -0,496 
non-bank deposits dnb 0,754  -0,201 
cash and central bank deposits B 0,841  0,114 
debt securities in issue sl -0,210  0,725 
securities sa 0,094  0,812 
Extractions method: analysis of main components 
Rotations method: Varimax with Kaiser-normalisation 
a) the rotation converges after 3 iterations   
 
  
factors  Table 3b: year 2002 
Rotated factor matrix
a) 
balance sheet items 
1 2 
equity capital c 0,787  -0,359 
non-bank deposits dnb 0,857  0,175 
debt securities in issue sl -0,364  -0,079 
cash and central bank deposits B 0,490 0,650 
securities sa -0,097  0,859 
Extractions method: analysis of main components 
Rotations method: Varimax with Kaiser-normalisation 
a) the rotation converges after 3 iterations   
 
The absolute values of the factor loadings assign the various variables to factors 1 and 2. 
These factors, of course, still have to be interpreted in economic terms. The correlation 
between these factors and the objects (banks) give us the factor values in Figures 2 and  3. 
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in bn of 
EURO 
1. Deutsche Bank 8,98 25,69 204,87 318,68 200,14 758,36 EUR  241,10 286,50 119,00 125,98 29,99 74,76 758,36  758,36 
2. HSBC Holdings plc 7,66 95,50 352,34 193,87 109,87 759,24 US-$  52,93 495,44 256,72 107,05 52,41 51,42 759,25  745,61 
3. UBS (Union Bank of Switzerland)  4,27  32,47 211,65 665,52 267,21 1181,12 CHF  83,18 306,88 229,99 615,00 38,99 94,55 1138,60  731,19 
4. ING  Bank                         11,42 45,68 284,45 297,58 77,24 716,37 EUR  96,27 319,82 n.a. 261,22 22,36 16,70 716,37  716,37 
5. BNP Paribas 9,88 146,51 225,34 121,72 206,87 710,32 EUR  177,91 195,57 70,95 145,84 26,45 164,55 710,32  710,32 
6. HVB (Bayerische Hypo/Vereinsbank)  5,37 73,87 409,94 187,24 14,74 691,16 EUR  143,36 154,92 49,55 271,66 14,23 106,99 691,16  691,16 
7. Royal Bank of Scotland 3,48 44,30 223,34 68,93 71,95 412,00 £  54,72 219,16 81,02 84,89 23,54 29,69 412,00  657,22 
8. Barclays  2,03 58,17 202,40 94,23 46,24 403,07 £  87,43 171,49 83,73 102,44 15,21 26,50 403,07  642,98 
9. Crédit Suisse 2,55 195,78 182,14 336,70 238,49 955,66 CHF  287,88 297,98 86,65 106,60 31,39 231,81 955,66  613,72 
10. HBOS (Halifax/Bank of Scotland)  1,37 11,84 240,88 50,28 50,71 355,08 £  45,64 150,22 123,26 89,68 13,77 55,77 355,08  566,42 
11. ABN AMRO Holding N.V.  9,46 41,92 254,59 157,23 92,82 556,02 EUR  95,88 239,28 n.a. 117,19 14,59 89,08 556,02  556,02 
12. Crédit Agricole           9,71  67,14 62,54 48,01 318,32 505,72 EUR  70,48 205,09 55,72 39,23 15,43 175,49 505,72  505,72 
13. Société Générale 5,09 54,35 184,64 93,30 163,89 501,27 EUR  69,24 196,09 57,52 165,63 15,73 54,58 501,27  501,27 
14. Fortis   4,49 83,86 172,14 154,61 70,67 485,77 EUR  96,55 177,64 54,61 77,12 10,87 123,59 485,77  485,77 
15. Commerzbank 8,47 54,34 148,51 201,74 9,07 422,13 EUR  114,98 95,70 33,11 92,73 8,81 109,91 422,13  422,13 
16. Dresdner Bank 4,88 88,37 157,02 121,54 41,64 413,45 EUR  127,54 143,84 58,62 54,59 11,97 75,51 413,45  413,45 
17. Lloyds TSB                 1,14 17,53 134,50 29,52 70,07 252,76 £  25,44 116,33 87,92 31,09 7,97 71,93 252,76  403,20 
18. Rabobank  3,81 47,23 225,25 82,38 16,05 374,72 EUR  85,89 171,63 n.a. 69,43 21,21 26,56 374,72  374,72 
19. Caisse d´Epargne      n.a.  155,92 116,57 54,89 29,75 357,13 EUR  76,76 170,09 26,49 67,57 9,30 33,41 357,13  357,13 
20. DZ Bank             0,88 93,64 106,94 78,09 58,71 338,26 EUR  122,92 72,65 8,41 83,04 5,99 53,66 338,26  338,26 
21. Abbey National plc 0,40 6,60 90,91 60,77 47,04 205,72 £  24,17 76,77 51,16 57,69 6,39 40,70 205,72  328,16 
22. Banco Santander Central Hispano  6,24 40,26 162,97 45,85 68,89 324,21 EUR  50,82 167,82 68,05 49,14 23,94 32,49 324,21  324,21 
23. LB Baden-Württemberg                 0,78 127,13 110,03 67,82 14,69 320,45 EUR  93,82 70,36 13,24 136,09 4,79 15,39 320,45  320,45 
24. Bayerische LB          0,70 112,22 102,46 66,16 18,17 299,71 EUR  112,37 52,04 6,58 104,30 8,47 22,53 299,71  299,71 
25. Gruppo Intesa 4,15 30,43 168,53 32,80 44,82 280,73 EUR  44,59 113,64 82,70 85,79 13,65 23,06 280,73  280,73 
26. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria  8,05 21,48 141,32 52,14 56,55 279,54 EUR  56,12 146,56 57,44 46,74 14,97 15,15 279,54  279,54 
27. NatWest  1,25 23,66 112,12 17,91 16,94 171,89 £  17,72 111,48 58,67 21,71 8,72 12,26 171,89  274,20 
28. West LB  (AG Konzern) 2,09 77,04 88,76 72,38 25,33 265,60 EUR  118,83 63,76 15,73 58,15 5,00 19,86 265,60  265,60 
29. KfW  (Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau)    0,03 129,28 85,78 32,15 13,69 260,93 EUR  31,76 39,76 0,14 162,60 6,49 20,32 260,93  260,93 
30. Credit Lyonnais 4,29 34,18 96,16 45,60 64,66 244,89 EUR  61,85 78,79 29,58 32,54 8,66 63,05 244,89  244,89 
31. Den Danske Bank Group 17,57 199,62 948,35 432,25 153,77 1751,55 DKR  319,57 427,94 214,75 910,35 60,32 33,37 1751,55  235,85 
32. KBC Group  0,05 29,30 98,78 61,90 31,70 221,73 EUR  39,68 113,72 20,83 38,17 8,43 21,73 221,73  221,73 
33. Banques Populaires n.a. 49,44 98,88 32,21 40,21 220,74 EUR  48,94 84,21 n.a. 31,40 7,21 48,98 220,74  220,74 
34. unicredito  1,61 28,10 113,82 38,64 31,18 213,35 EUR  31,99 93,57 n.a. 62,51 10,46 14,82 213,35  213,35 
35. DEXIA  1,55 43,51 71,91 69,85 22,33 209,15 EUR  47,13 77,50 21,72 52,49 9,64 22,39 209,15  209,15 
36. San Paolo di Torino  1,41 22,00 126,70 19,69 33,97 203,77 EUR  24,46 85,28 60,46 70,37 5,14 18,52 203,77  203,77 
37. Nord LB   0,44 58,74 77,12 45,33 15,52 197,15 EUR  69,06 43,30 7,51 63,87 5,03 15,89 197,15  197,15 
38. Bankgesellschaft Berlin  1,39 30,80 89,58 42,96 10,07 174,80 EUR  59,35 57,09 13,01 44,17 3,89 10,30 174,80  174,80 
39. LB Hessen-Thüringen Girozentrale   0,31  46,52 60,03 30,76 15,34 152,95 EUR  53,53 33,61 5,66 45,15 3,53 17,13 152,95  152,95 
40. Bank Austria  (member of HVB-Group)  1,82 29,56 76,35 36,93 3,31 147,97 EUR  41,03 56,56 16,81 30,50 4,61 15,27 147,97  147,97 
41. Landesbank SWH 0,23 33,73 66,85 40,96 3,74 145,51 EUR  47,51 30,75 5,19 53,46 5,60 8,19 145,51  145,51 
42. Banca di Roma    4,12 20,42 80,09 13,64 22,67 140,94 EUR  31,58 52,11 44,76 41,48 2,21 13,56 140,94  140,94 
43. Svenska Handelsbanken 8,17 79,52 839,34 129,73 220,76 1277,51 SEK  235,11 292,84 191,85 624,98 52,19 72,39 1277,51  139,26 
44. SEB (Skandinaviska E. Banken)  13,47 150,38 680,21 206,61 190,44 1241,11 SEK  234,29 499,54 330,93 364,24 45,70 97,34 1241,11  135,29 
45. Banca Monte dei Paschi 0,83 16,03 68,47 12,45 31,10 128,88 EUR  20,52 77,25 n.a. 18,93 1,68 10,50 128,88  128,88 
46. BBL (member of ING-Bank)  0,66 18,41 57,59 31,21 6,98 114,86 EUR  41,53 56,49 19,53 6,95 3,73 6,16 114,86  114,86 
47. Standard Chartered 1,10 16,00 57,01 22,30 16,60 113,01 US-$  10,85 71,63 24,73 16,49 7,33 6,71 113,01  110,98 
48. Swedbank Group 6,72 98,66 703,40 64,88 83,84 957,50 SEK  102,81 263,42 219,00 472,84 38,59 79,84 957,50  104,38 
49. La Caixa Group  1,55 10,09 61,44 14,39 15,56 103,02 EUR  12,82 65,52 14,93 9,38 5,40 9,90 103,02  103,02 
50. Hamburgische LB 0,26 22,12 42,81 23,96 3,51 92,66 EUR  24,33 31,09 4,72 27,35 4,10 5,79 92,66  92,66 
51. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro  0,52 6,82 60,25 4,32 11,80 83,71 EUR   14,97 53,35 n.a. 6,38 3,85 5,16 83,71  83,71 
52. WGZ BANK                  0,17 24,05 21,03 11,85 2,81 59,91 EUR  29,04 9,36 0,91 18,51 1,24 1,76 59,91  59,91 
 
Source: The author´s own calculations based on data provided by the 50 largest European banks. 